Those interested in international political affairs would largely agree that engagement in the international arena forms the foundation for determining a state's foreign policy, alliances, agreements, and enmities. However, this engagement, in its purest form, is not always the outwardly declared nature of relationships. States, particularly those with significant cultural influence, international ambitions, or strong ideological commitments, tend to frame their interests and strive to maximize them within ethical frameworks or in alignment with the cultural orientations of their target communities, or at least with their own societal values.
In general, the majority of states seek some "moral" justification for their blatant opportunism, utility, and even aggression and destruction of others. This approach can be taken to extreme levels, as exemplified by the United States, which has justified its interests on religious grounds, such as the 'Crusades of Bush Jr.,' or a humanitarian democratic morality, as with Obama. Trump, on the other hand, almost abandoned these pretenses, settling for the superficial slogan of 'the war on terror.'
Trump's approach was indicative of a state that had lost its identity, often a state in transition in the international arena, with neither a crystallized external identity nor sometimes even an internal one. Such a state might be in the process of abandoning its previous policies and ideologies, either searching for a new framework or completely rejecting the old. Additionally, it might be too small to possess a clear identity.
Many states lack a coherent identity, whether national, religious, or otherwise. This also includes an international political identity. Clear examples of this can be found in the Arab world, where many states have either lost their identities or never acquired one: the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar are prime examples.
These states are often more aligned with "immoral" foreign policies and may even acknowledge that their opportunism is transparent. They frequently attempt to promote their unethical political model as the simplest means to achieve their interests without much effort.
While these states' policy approaches may appear unpredictable, they are, in reality, simpler than others. Their approach is based on a constant shift towards the most significant interest, even if temporary, leading to repeated transformations.
Despite the temporary gains these states may achieve, they lose many permanent benefits, foremost among them being the establishment of a regional social incubator where they are seen as the supreme model and can establish long-term "social" legitimacy for their interests.
Moreover, this policy is primarily linked to the individuals who shape it and disregards social forces in other states. It seeks to preserve its interests by maintaining the structures of other states and the continuity of authoritarian structures, undermining any social activities that may threaten their interests. If the authorities in those states fail to offer the desired interests, these states may work to overthrow or even destroy the targeted state entirely, if possible.
Additionally, states with policies devoid of moral justifications are subject to constant suspicion from other actors, due to the lack of a consistent pattern in their policies or their flexibility, opportunism, and shifting positions. Other actors, or some of them, may view such a state as an entity that can be compromised, rather than a state with a distinct status and irreconcilable red lines.
Some European states attempt to maintain remnants of their "ethics," particularly concerning Syria. However, this modest "morality" does not justify their interests; it is a result of the loss of effectiveness in addressing the Syrian issue, making their "morality" hypocritical and another form of blatant Arab opportunism.
The above can be applied to the UAE's rush to announce the 'Normalization' of relations with Israel—relations that have existed for many years on multiple levels: political, military, security, technological, intelligence, and economic. Like the smaller states in the Arab Gulf, the UAE always operates by building a volatile and dependent foreign policy on several external powers to balance its small size and lack of political weight against powerful neighbors (what can be termed 'Saudi phobia,' the UAE and Qatar's constant concern about Saudi Arabia, despite apparent rapprochements).
Furthermore, the UAE's rush goes beyond this context and represents a blatant interest, showcasing the loss of the Arab and Islamic identity in its foreign policy. It hopes that its alignment with Israel will enable the reproduction of the Middle East, leading to the disintegration and fragmentation of remaining active forces and the creation of small, controllable entities. This includes their ongoing efforts to separate eastern Syria and build a state for the SDF militia, military occupation of their Gulf region, and pushing Egypt towards constant preoccupation. Additionally, there is a prominent Emirati presence on several military or security-intelligence fronts, seeking to formulate a fragmented and identity-less region.
Dr. ABD ALQDER NANAA